Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the symmetrical core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zeromonotonicity, or monotonicity.
Introduction of the Information Market Game
Consider the following problem 1 . Besides n firms with identical characteristics, there exists an agent called the innovator, having relevant information for the firms. The innovator is not going to use the information for himself, but this information can be sold to the firms. Any firm that decides to acquire the new information e.g., a new technology is supposed to make use of the information. The n potential users of the information are the same before and after the innovator offers the new technology. The firms acquiring the information will be better than before obtaining it, while their utilities are computed under a conservator point of view, assuming that for any uninformed firm, the probability of making the right decision can be described by a binomial probability distribution, being 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 the uniform probability of having success. The probability that k among n firms take the right decision is given by n k · p k · 1 − p n−k , and hence, the expected aggregated utility of k firms having success is given
Here u k ≥ 0 represents the utility if k firms make a right decision. 
It is left to the reader to verify
The case p 1 yields v S s · u n for all S ⊆ N \ {1} and so, it concerns the inessential additive game corresponding with the vector 0, u n , u n , . . . , u n ∈ R n 1 . The case p 0 yields zero worth to all coalitions not containing the innovator and so, it concerns the so-called big boss game 2 with the innovator acting as the big boss . We summarize the main result s of Galdeano et al. 
applied to the normalization u 1 1. The main goal of the current paper is to determine the nucleolus of the information market game and for that purpose, we explore and characterize the symmetrical part of the core, provided nonemptiness of the core.
Properties of the Information Market Game
This section reports properties of the characteristic function for the information market game. In fact, we claim the equivalence of three game properties called super-additivity, zero-monotonicity, and monotonicity . The proof of their equivalence is based on the monotonic increasing average profit function for coalitions not containing the innovator, that is, f n s /s ≤ f n s 1 / s 1 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. This significant property has not been discovered before and allows us to report an equivalence theorem, which sharpens the previous Theorem 1.2. 
ii v S v {i} ≤ v S ∪ {i} for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N \ {i} zero-monotonicity .
iii v S ≤ v T for all S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T monotonicity . 
Proof of Lemma 2.3 .
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Generally speaking, the proof is based on the combinatorial relationship
j−2 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ s and proceeds as follows:
where the relevant inequality holds because the monotonic decreasing sequence u k k∈N
This proves part i . Concerning part ii , suppose without loss of generality, 1 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ n − 1 with s t ≤ n. By applying part i twice, we obtain
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The super-additivity condition for disjoint, nonempty coalitions S, T ⊆ N \ {1} not containing the innovator 1 reduces to f n s t ≥ f n s f n t , whose inequality holds by Lemma 2.3 ii . For disjoint, nonempty coalitions S, T ⊆ N with 1
and so, the corresponding super-additivity condition reduces to v S ≤ v S ∪ {1} or equivalently, f n s ≤ s · u n for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n. By Lemma 2.3 i , it is necessary and sufficient that f n n /n ≤ u n . This proves the equivalence super-additivity ⇔ f n n /n ≤ u n .
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The zero-monotonicity condition for coalitions S containing the innovator is redundant since u n ≥ p · u n . Among coalitions S not containing the innovator, the zeromonotonicity condition reduces to either f n s 1 ≥ f n s f n 1 , whose inequality holds by Lemma 2.3 ii , or s · u n ≥ f n s . As before, it is necessary and sufficient that u n ≥ f n n /n.
Finally, note that the monotonicity condition requires v S ≤ v S ∪ {1} for all S ⊆ N \ {1}, S / ∅, or equivalently, f n s ≤ s · u n for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
The Core of the Information Market Game
Generally speaking, marginal contributions of players are well known as upper bounds for pay-offs according to core allocations, that is, x i ≤ v N − v N \ {i} for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ CORE N, v . Throughout the paper, given a pay-off vector x x i i∈N ∈ R n 1 and a coalition S ⊆ N, we denote x S i∈S x i , where x ∅ 0. The core allocations are selected through efficiency and group rationality. The core, however, is a set-valued solution concept, which fails to satisfy the symmetry property in that users of the same type receive identical pay-offs according to core allocations. In order to determine the single-valued solution concept called nucleolus 4 , being some symmetrical core allocation, our main goal is to investigate the symmetrical part of the core.
ii The symmetrical core allocations require equal pay-offs to users, that is, Proof . i Choose x ∈ CORE N, v if core is nonempty. Clearly, by 3.1 , for all i ∈ N,
ii In case p 1, then the core-constraints v {i} ≤ x i ≤ v N − v N \ {i} reduce to p · u n ≤ x i ≤ u n and so, x i u n for all x ∈ CORE N, v , and all i ∈ N, i / 1. Consequently, by efficiency, x 1 0. The resulting vector 0, u n , u n , . . . , u n does indeed satisfy all the core constraints.
iii In case 0 ≤ p < 1, apply part i to the information market game to conclude that b
Journal of Applied Mathematics iv Under the given circumstances, 1 ∈ S, together with 1.3 , we derive the following: ii The symmetrical core is non-empty, SymCORE N, v / ∅.
The implication i ⇒ iii is due to Lemma 3.2 iii . Notice the equivalences iii ⇔ iv as well as iv ⇔ v . The implication ii ⇒ i is trivial. It remains to show the implication iv ⇒ ii , the proof of which will be postponed till Section 4.
Remark 3.4. The significant condition f n n /n ≤ u n is equivalent to g n p ≤ g n 1 , where the function g n : 0, 1 → R is defined by
Note that p is treated as a variable and that the function satisfies g n 1 u n . It is known that any function of the form g p p a · 1 − p b is monotonic increasing on the interval 0, a/ a b and monotonic decreasing on the interval a/ a b , 1 such that its maximum is attained by p a/ a b at level g a/ a b a a · b b / a b a b . In our framework, the function g n p is composed as the sum of n functions, each of one is monotonic increasing on the subinterval 0, k 1 /n and monotonic decreasing on the subinterval k 1 /n, 1 such that its maximum value equals k 1
On the final interval n − 1 /n, 1 , all the components are monotonic decreasing, except for the very last component given by u n · p n . Further investigation about the graph of the function g n p is desirable.
The Nucleolus of the Information Market Game
A direct consequence of Lemma 3.2 iv and Lemma 2.3 i is the following characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. 
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ii A symmetrical pay-off vector 
For the purpose of the determination of the nucleolus of the information market game, the next lemma reports the maximal excess levels at symmetrical pay-off vectors x α n · u n − α , α, α, . . . , α ∈ R n 1 . Proof . i For all S ⊆ N with 1 ∈ S, it holds that
Under the additional assumption α ≤ u n , we obtain − n 1−s · u n −α ≤ − u n −α , that is, the maximum is attained for n-person coalitions of the form N \ {i}, i / 1, provided S / N . On the other, for all S ⊆ N, S / ∅, with 1 / ∈ S, it holds e v S, x α v S − x α S f n s − s · α.
Journal of Applied Mathematics
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that the symmetrical core of the n 1 -person information market game is nonempty, that is, u n ≥ f n n /n. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ n be a maximizer in that
Let α f n t u n / t 1 and x α n · u n − α , α, α, . . . , α ∈ R n 1 .
i Then the pay-off vector x α belongs to the symmetrical core in that f n n /n ≤ α ≤ u n .
ii The nucleolus of the n 1 -person information market game equals x α .
Proof . Suppose n · u n ≥ f n n . The following equivalences hold:
By Lemma 2.3 i , the latter inequality holds since f n t /t ≤ f n n /n ≤ u n . So, on the one hand, α ≤ u n . On the other, from 4.6 applied to s n as well as the assumption u n ≥ f n n /n, it follows that:
ii From part i and Lemma 4.3 i , on the one hand, we derive the following:
− u n − α and on the other,
where the latter equality is due to the choice of α. The equality s v 12 y s v 21 y for y x α suffices to conclude that the nucleolus is given by x α . Notice that −s v 12 x α u n − α represents the maximal bargaining range within the core by transferring money from player 1 to player 2 starting at core allocation x α while remaining in the core. By Lemma 3.2 iv , recall the redundancy of core constraints induced by coalitions containing player 1, so no lower bound for core allocations to player 1.
If the worth of any coalition not containing player 1 is zero for instance, the big boss games , that is, f n s 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n, then Theorem 4.4 applies with t 1, α u n /2, yielding the nucleolus to simplify to u n /2 · n, 1, 1, . . . , 1 . Thus, the nucleolus pay-off to the big boss equals the aggregate pay-off to all the users. 1 and e i is the ith standard vector in R n 1 . Note that, for any 1 ≤ s ≤ n, the underlying condition f n n u n / n 1 ≥ f n s u n / s 1 may be rewritten as n · u n − f n n for all S ⊆ N with 1 ∈ S and g v S s · u n − f n s otherwise. Consequently, the n 1 -person information market game of the form 1.1 -1.2 satisfies 1-convexity if and only if any slope Δ f n s f n n − f n s / n − s , 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, is bounded from below by the utility u n in that Δ f n s ≥ u n , together with Δ f n 0 ≤ u n provided f n 0 0 . Observe that the latter condition, together with Lemma 2.3 i , implies the validity of 4.10 with reference to the case t n of Theorem 4.4. To conclude, the 1-convexity property for n 1 -person information market games is part of the case t n and the current procedure for the determination of the nucleolus agrees with the known approach being the center of gravity of the non-empty core. n · u n − f n n , it follows that 4.13 reduces to 1 − p · u n ≤ b v 1 ≤ 2 · 1 − p · u n or equivalently, n − 2 2 · p · u n ≤ f n n ≤ n − 1 p · u n . 4.14 Consequently, the n 1 -person information market game satisfies 2-convexity if and only if 4.14 holds as well as any slope Δ f n s , 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, is bounded from below by u n . Particularly, 4.10 holds for all 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. Finally, it is left to the reader to derive from 4.14 the relevant inequality involving s 1. That is, f n n u n n 1 ≥ f n 1 u n 2 provided n ≥ 3, 0 ≤ p < 1, where f n 1 p · u n . 4.15
